[JNV] JNV Non-Stop Walk Aldermaston-London / New Briefing: We Nearly Won

[Justice Not Vengeance]

1) Non-Stop JNV Walk from Aldermaston To London: Text Us!
2) JNV Briefing: We Nearly Won

Dear friends

Please find below a briefing and a notification of a JNV/Peace News
action starting Easter Monday.

Best wishes

Maya Anne Evans
Milan Rai

-----


1) Non-Stop JNV Walk from Aldermaston To London!

Maya Anne Evans, author of Naming the Dead, and the first person to be
convicted under the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, has just
done a half-marathon, and is very fit.

Milan Rai, author of 7/7: The London Bombings, Islam and the Iraq War,
and co-editor of Peace News, has not just done a half-marathon, and
is not very fit.

We're both part of JNV.

We are walking to London (some of the way along the historic CND
Aldermaston-London route) round the clock, with naps every six
hours. (We have a very wonderful support person in a car also.)

Why are we doing this? Because we oppose replacing Trident, we oppose
war on Iran, we want every country in the world to have stringent
controls on its nuclear activities. And like everyone at the
Aldermaston demo, we're in a hurry.

How you can help:

A) Text us to keep our spirits up (mainly on Tuesday!)

Mil: 07980 748 555
Maya: 07973484202

B) Make a donation towards the cost of the walk:

Please send a cheque made out to JNV to JNV, 29 Gensing Road, St
Leonards on Sea, East Sussex TN38 0HE.

Thank you!


-----


2) JNV Briefing: We Nearly Won


The Extraordinary Achievements of the Anti-War Movement

Justice Not Vengeance Anti-War Briefing 112 (12 March 2008)


BRITAIN NEARLY DISCONNECTED FROM THE WAR

The goal of the British anti-war movement in early 2003 was to stop
the British government participating in the invasion of Iraq, hoping
that this could delay or derail the US drive to war. We nearly
succeeded.

The mass media and the party political system have never and will
never acknowledge how close we came. The history books are and will
remain silent on this topic, but it is vital for the anti-war movement
to remember that it managed to exert such pressure on the British
Government that a week before the war, it seriously considered
withdrawing from the invasion of Iraq.


THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

Throughout the crisis the US public was very concerned at the prospect
of political isolation - polls in the US in June and Aug. 2002 found
that while more than half of Americans would approve of military
action against Iraq if the US won some allied support, that number
shrank to a minority if the United States had to go it alone.
(Christian Science Monitor, 17 July 2002; 'Poll: Most Americans Back
War Against Iraq', Reuters, 12 Aug. 2002)

In March 2003, 'research from the National Journal showed the
importance of the UK in the Bush administration's domestic political
calculation: 77 per cent of people said "we absolutely need" to have
British support in the event of war in Iraq.' (FT, 14 Mar. 2003, p. 2)
In other words, the US anti-war movement, while not strong enough to
prevent the war, was strong enough to force Washington to seek
international support - particularly from Britain.


THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFUSES	

The problem was that the British anti-war movement was so powerful
that Tony Blair was forced to spend months seeking a UN Security
Council Resolution which he could present as in some way "authorising"
the invasion.

In Feb. 2003, a BBC poll found 40 per cent of people would support a
war only if there was UN authorization and only 9 per cent would
support it without authorization - which is what happened (45 per cent
opposed the war whether or not the Security Council approved; BBC
press release, 12 Feb 2003, http://tinyurl.com/ynu6rw)

Permanent members of the Security Council threatened to veto any US/UK
war resolution, so Tony Blair moved to a fall-back position. He would
regard the war as "UN-authorized" if a substantial majority in the
Security Council - if 9 out of 15 members - voted in favour of a war
resolution.

However, despite enormous pressure, the smaller "middle six" undecided
countries - Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Guinea, Mexico and Pakistan -
refused to support the US/UK Resolution, robbing Tony Blair of his
majority and his crucial propaganda device. This was in large part
because of the protests from the anti-war movements in these
countries.

'In varying degrees,' it was reported at the time, 'all six need
money, trade and good will... Other than Pakistan, however, none has a
direct stake in the outcome of the Iraq crisis. All have said they
disapprove equally of what they see of the U.S. rush to war and the
French willingness to allow open- ended U.N. weapons inspections. And
each is dependent for its survival on public and political opinion
that is overwhelmingly against a vote for war in Iraq.' (Washington
Post, 14 March 2003, p. A22)

The US anti-war movement forced Bush to keep Britain on board. The
British anti-war movement forced Blair to spend months pleading with
small countries at the UN. The global anti-war movement then denied
Blair and Bush the political cover they needed at the UN.


THE TURKISH MIRACLE

What worried the British Government even more as it approached the 18
March war vote in the House of Commons was the fact that in Turkey, a
country much more dependant financially, militarily and politically on
the US than Britain, a similar Parliamentary vote had been lost.

On 1 March 2003, while the biggest demonstration in years was taking
place outside Parliament, and MPs were being phoned by their
constituents in the debating chamber, a resolution to allow the US to
use Turkish territory and airspace to invade Iraq was lost by four
votes. (BBC News Online, 1 March 2003, http://tinyurl.com/3yxs9e) The
Financial Times suggested that the sheer scale of the grassroots
opposition to war 'may have been the deciding factor'. (6 June 2003,
p. 19)

The vote meant that the British contribution became militarily
significant, much to everyone's surprise. Edward Luttwak, senior
fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC, pointed out that originally, with a light, fast
invasion force, Britain would have made up a third of the  entire
force. 	Then, for various reasons, the US deployment was enlarged, and
'the British role became smaller and smaller.'

When Turkey refused access to US ground forces, all the US northern
invasion force units were 'stuck on the wrong side of the Suez Canal',
and British forces in Kuwait, in the south, once more became
'indispensable': 'Sandwiched together, with units under each other's
command, Yanks and Brits are more closely integrated than they have
been since the Second World War - and that is why a last- minute
withdrawal by Mr Blair has become simply unthinkable.' (Sunday
Telegraph, 16 March 2003, p. 6)


THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: DISCONNECTION

It may have been unthinkable for Luttwak, but, the Sunday Telegraph
and Sunday Mirror both reported that it wasn't unthinkable in
Whitehall. 'By Tuesday [12 March], there were serious worries in the
White House that Mr Blair, its staunchest ally, might not survive the
political crisis at home. Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, tried to
explain the problems to Donald Rumsfeld, the US defence secretary, in
a telephone call which had meant to be devoted to the fine detail of
the war plan.

'As we reveal today, Mr Hoon's department [the Ministry of Defence]
was frantically preparing contingency plans to "disconnect" British
troops entirely from the military invasion of Iraq, demoting their
role to subsequent phases of the campaign and peacekeeping.

'Mr Rumsfeld - who had always believed that the "UN route" was the
road to perdition - was already deeply exasperated by Mr Blair's
insistence that a second resolution was necessary, and the delays that
the horse-trading at the UN was causing. Mr Rumsfeld confided to one
friend, "I am learning to hate the British."


'However, he decided to give them a way out. Later that day, at a
press conference in Washington, Mr Rumsfeld suggested that US troops
could go to war without the British if necessary. One Cabinet Minister
said, in tones of desperation: "It is just Rumsfeld being Rumsfeld."
The British media was encouraged to believe that the US Defence
Secretary had been speaking hypothetically.

'The trouble was that he hadn't been doing any such thing. As a senior
Number 10 official said: "Rumsfeld was telling the truth." ... In a
second call on his secure telephone, Mr Hoon told Mr Rumsfeld in blunt
terms that his remarks were causing pandaemonium. "Wobbly Tuesday" was
the lowest point of the crisis for Mr Blair.' (Sunday Telegraph, 16
Mar., p. 18; see also Sunday Mirror, 16 March 2003, p. 6)


DELAY AND DISCONNECTION

The global anti-war movements, and the British anti-war movement in
particular, brought the war leaders to point where George Bush offered
Tony Blair the option of withdrawal: 'I told Tony, I said "rather than
lose your government, withdraw from the coalition" - because I felt it
was important for him to be the Prime Minister at this point in our
relationship.' (Observer, 23 Apr. 2006 <tinyurl.com/387tdr>) Blair
himself recently confirmed this offer - made days before the 18 March
vote. (Times, 17 Nov. 2007 <tinyurl.com/ywo5m5>)

'One confidant explained: "Having taken it so far, backing out seemed
to him a rather pathetic thing to do."' (Independent, 31 Oct. 2007
<tinyurl.com/2w68v8>)

The delays created by the global antiwar movements nearly derailed the
drive to war. It is possible that even a few days' more delay could
have given the UN weapons inspectors the time they needed to institute
a final and decisive phase of inspections that would have made war
politically impossible. (See Milan Rai's Regime Unchanged, Pluto 2003)
We know that the British Government was forced to desperately draw up
contingency plans only days before war.

These are significant achievements for popular movements with very
limited resources. Governments prize the appearance of overwhelming
strength and confidence. We now know that this war was avoidable and
that the war leaders were not an irresistable force.

Our movement shook the Government to its core. Next time we will win.