[JNV] Iran Negotiations - JNV Briefings

[JNV]

Dear friends

Today President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is speaking before the UN General Assembly (not long after President George W. Bush). He is likely to make an important statement in relation to the nuclear crisis. 

The two briefings below (which will shortly be on the JNV website) give some of the relevant background to whatever may be said today. I hope you find them useful.

Best wishes

Milan Rai
JNV


***


IRAN CRISIS: NEGOTIATING PEACE
JNV Anti-War Briefing 96
18 September 2006

CUTTING THROUGH THE CONFUSION
The Iran nuclear crisis has been subject to government propaganda, media misrepresentation, and straightforward confusion. The US Government has made alarming allegations. For its part, the Western media has  reinforced such propaganda, and seriously misrepresented the Iranian scene.

To cut through the confusion, we need to understand the structure of power in Iran, and the actual foreign policy orientation and negotiating strategy of the Iranian leadership. The 'Supreme Leader' of Iran is committed to a negotiated solution to the current crisis, and his leadership is willing to give up many of Iran's nuclear ambitions to achieve this objective, despite the bluster we have sometimes heard from President Ahmadinejad.

We also need to see through US propaganda. For example, Condoleezza Rice's highly conditional offer to sit down with Iran at the negotiating table was not a serious attempt to create a diplomatic solution, but an effort to isolate Iran, and to derail any possible diplomatic solution.

Much now turns on minute details obscured by both sides.

THE SUPREME LEADER
As we pointed out in Briefing 87, in Iran, 'It is the Supreme Leader, not the president, who controls the armed forces and makes decisions on security, defence and major foreign policy issues.' (BBC, <http://tinyurl.com/mklrc>) 

We know that the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, offered the US a 'grand bargain' in 2003 in a fax sent directly to the US State Department. Flynt Leverett, then a senior director on the US National Security Council, saw the proposal, which he described as 'a serious effort.' Iran wanted an end to US sanctions, full access to peaceful nuclear technology, and a recognition of its 'legitimate security interests.' In return, Iran was willing to offer nuclear safeguards, 'decisive action' against terrorists, coordination in Iraq, an end to 'material support' for Palestinian militias, and support for the Saudi initiative for a two-state Israeli-Palestine solution. (Washington Post, 18 June 2006 <tinyurl.com/pfota>)

This is far from the angry rhetoric of Ahmadinejad, but it continues to be the basic position of the Iranian leadership, which is far from 'fanatical'. This was confirmed during the visit of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami to the US in Sept., when Khatami re-affirmed Iran's acceptance of the two-state solution: 'I think Hamas itself, which has come to power today in a democratic process, is ready to live alongside Israel... Of course whatever Palestinians think is respected by us.' (FT, 5 Sept. 2006, p. 12)

100 CENTRIFUGES
Gareth Smyth, Financial Times correspondent in Tehran, is well-connected. On 19 June, two Iranian 'insiders' told him 'a majority in the leadership would, once talks developed, accept a compromise over the nuclear programme that allowed it to keep some uranium enrichment in Iran'. 

There was some uncertainty over numbers. 'One of the insiders said Iran might settle for a limit as low as three cascades of 164 centrifuges [492 centrifuges in total], with the vast bulk of uranium for its planned nuclear reactors enriched in Russia, as Moscow first proposed last year.' The other 'insider' said: 'Around 70 per cent of senior people' might accept a limit of 'hundreds or thousands' of centrifuges - 'adding that President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad was in the minority'. (FT, 19 June, p. 8 <tinyurl.com/fddcz>)

Originally, Iran wanted 54,000 centrifuges. <tinyurl.com/nk2wf>

A few days later, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 'established a new body to supervise foreign policy in a move seen by some politicians in Tehran as a way to counterbalance the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad.' The head of the new 'Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy', Kamal Kharrazi, former Foreign Minister under reformist President Khatami, spoke of 'including experts from previous governments.' The former Vice-President Mohammad Ali Abtahi 'said the body's composition meant "the continuation of detente".' (FT, 28 June, p. 13)

Interestingly, the Supreme Leader said that the new body should 'help facilitate macro-decision making... find new horizons... and make use of intellectuals.' Khamenei also said the term 'principle-ist', usually claimed by fundamentalists such as Ahmadinejad, should apply to anyone 'of any trend... committed to the principles of the revolution'. (FT, 28 June, p. 13) Ahmadinejad (like Bush) is noted for ignoring the intelligentsia (see Smyth, 'Iran's intellectuals left in cold by populist president', FT, 21 June, p. 13)

In setting up the new Strategic Committee for Foreign Policy, Smyth reported, 'Ayatollah Khamenei may also be acting to build consensus within Iran's leadership, where different tactics have been aired in recent months over how to proceed with the nuclear programme.' (FT, 28 June, p. 13) 

In late Aug., Smyth reported: 'after public disagreements among top officials over policy earlier this year, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, has quietly built a consensus among the political elite, including the leadership group of about eight that takes key decisions.'

At the end of Aug., Smyth reported that Iranian officials had 'closed ranks over the country's nuclear programme', quoting Mohammad Atrianfar, editor of Shargh, the reformist newspaper: 'The leadership is thinking together, with the leader at the core.' (FT, 31 Aug., p. 7)

The consensus was expressed in terms of the suspension of enrichment (see below), and the low number of centrifuges Iran was willing to accept. 'In July, Sadegh Kharazzi, a former ambassador to Paris... told the FT the leadership was ready to negotiate a deal in which Iran limited enrichment inside the country to "some 100" centrifuges.' (13 Sept., p. 9) This is completely inadequate for the production of weapons-grade uranium. (See US nuclear designer R. Garwin <tinyurl.com/lbba6> for relevant figures.)

NUCLEAR SUSPENSION
A lot of the recent controversy has turned around the issue of suspending Iran's uranium enrichment programme before negotiations can begin. Under US pressure, this demand was incorporated into UN Security Council Resolution 1696 <tinyurl.com/j8v76>. Iran, in contrast, (correctly) sees uranium enrichment as its legal right, under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty <tinyurl.com/87t7x>. This is a popular, nationalist issue. The Guardian's Simon Tisdall reports from Tehran: 'For Ahmadinejad and the heirs to Khomeini, the nuclear issue is about much more than nuclear bombs. It is about national pride.' (8 Sept., <tinyurl.com/fk49n>) 

Iranian national pride suffered a real blow when the government suspended uranium enrichment between Nov. 2004 and Jan. 2006 with no tangible benefits. It therefore became politically impossible in Tehran to accept the demand for suspension-before-negotiations. 

That is why the US has focused on this demand. (See Briefing 95: Designed To Be Refused.) The Iranian leadership has responded by resolutely refusing to suspend enrichment before negotiations take place, but agreeing to suspend during negotiations, both processes starting simultaneously. 

The first hint of such a breakthrough came (demonstrating the new consensus) from President Ahmadinejad. When asked by a reporter from Etelaat newspaper if Iran might announce the suspension of uranium enrichment during Kofi Annan's visit to the country, he said: 'Please accept you will receive an answer later.' (FT, 30 Aug., p. 8)

NEGOTIATING SUSPENSION
The West demands that Iran suspend enrichment. In 2004, Western negotiators spelled out 'suspension' in detail. In June 2006, the demand has been left vague. 'Diplomats involved in the talks said that Iran's six potential negotiating partners - the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany - left the definition of suspension vague to maintain unity on their side and to lure the Iranians back to the negotiating table.' 

Defined narrowly, 'suspension' could mean allowing Iran to continuing running the centrifuges, but in a vacuum, without injecting uranium gas, and therefore without actual enrichment. (For more details of the enrichment process, see JNV Catalogue: Drawing Paradise on the 'Axis of Evil'.) (Note that even running centrifuges in vacuum can increase skills and knowledge for operating large-scale enrichment programmes. <tinyurl.com/g3zyy>)

Defined broadly, suspension could mean halting the spinning centrifuges (risking their damage or destruction), ending the production of centrifuges and their parts, and so on. (NYT, 18 June <tinyurl.com/q8jx6>)

Iran is in effect seeking pre-negotiations on such questions, while holding out the offer of up to two months' suspension. (See Iran's very important official response to the 6 June proposals <tinyurl.com/oh6ea>.) Iran is attempting to negotiate a way out of the crisis. 

The US is not. (See Briefing 95, below.)


*****


DESIGNED TO BE REFUSED: The Phony US Diplomatic 'Offer' To Iran
JNV Anti-War Briefing 95 
27 July 2006

A RICE U-TURN?
On 31 May, US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice made a dramatic announcement regarding US policy towards Iran. After steadfastly refusing to contemplate face-to-face talks with the Iranian government over its nuclear power programme, the United States was now ready to join in multilateral talks with Iran, alongside members of the European Union. 

Presented in much of the British press as a 'U-turn', there was in fact less to the offer than it appeared at first sight. The US is taking a gamble in making this offer to Iran, but the risk it is taking is that Tehran will accept the poison chalice being presented by Washington. 

The US is only making this offer because it is confident that the Iranian government will refuse to accept the preconditions to negotiations that the US is trying to impose. 

ENRICHMENT SUSPENSION
The Iranian government has been adamant that its uranium enrichment programme, which is entirely legal under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, must be preserved in some form in any negotiated settlement. The US is demanding that enrichment be 'fully and verifiably' suspended before it will start negotiations. In other words: 'give up your main bargaining chip before you sit down to talk'. 

The Financial Times reported the (foreseeable) reaction under the headline, 'Rice talks offer set to deepen scepticism in Tehran'. The 'offer' was creating negative rather than positive feelings in Iranian ruling circles.

THREATENING LANGUAGE
There were two main reasons. Firstly, Condoleezza Rice's 'insistence that "all options", including threatened military strikes, were on the table will increase the deep scepticism in Tehran over US motives and rally those in outright opposition to any talks. (FT, 31 May 2006 <http://tinyurl.com/lrcms>) 

Rice had been asked in her press conference: 'you have always refused to rule out the military option against Iran. But are you prepared to consider taking that option off the table, at least temporarily while negotiations go ahead?' She replied: 'The President is not going to take any of his options off the table, temporarily or otherwise.' 

Rice was even more threatening: 'we're not going to stop work on - with our friends and allies - on what we might do if Iran makes the wrong choice.... We have options that are very near-term options should they not make the right choice.' <http://tinyurl.com/jf6nf>

THE PRECONDITION 
The second reason for Iranian concern was the suspension precondition. The FT reported: 'Even those arguing that any successful negotiations over Iran's atomic programme must involve the US are likely to reject Ms Rice's demand that Iran first end all uranium enrichment. Iran's bottom line for its nuclear programme appears, at the very least, to be continuing the research project resumed in January at the Natanz plant, which enriches uranium in 164 centrifuges.' 

Even the most conciliatory elements in ruling circles are likely to refuse to accept the US proposal. Given the previous history of Iranian suspension during EU negotiations, which produced nothing tangible from an Iranian point of view, and cost the government considerable public anger, this was foreseeable. 

The US imposed this precondition knowing it was likely to be rejected by even the most 'open' parts of the Iranian foreign policy establishment. 

TIMING THE PROPOSAL 
It seems entirely likely that the US proposal came when it did because of a recent hardening of the Iranian position on negotiations, increasing the chances of rejection. For some time now the idea has been in the air of negotiations between Washington and Tehran on the situation in Iraq, where the US has major troop deployment and a substantial political investment, on the one hand, and where Iran has major security concerns (as a neighbouring country) on the other. 

The US has blown hot and cold on whether to hold these talks for some time. Iran was initially positive, but on 26 May the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said they were no longer prepared to hold such discussions: 'The American side tried to use this decision as propaganda, and they raised some other issues, they tried to create a negative atmosphere, and that is why the decision which was taken is for the time being suspended.' (BBC, 26 May 2006, <tinyurl.com/zymmm>)

SUMMARY 
The US chose a moment when Iran seemed to be moving away from the idea of engaging with the West, to launch a diplomatic initiative. The initiative was accompanied by threatening language warning of imminent attack options, and it demanded of the Iranians a concession which even the most conciliatory elements in Iranian ruling circles are known to regard as unacceptable. What conclusion can one draw other than that the proposal was made to be refused? 

CONFIRMATION: THE TIMES 
This indeed is the analysis, reading between the lines, of The Times columnist Gerard Baker (Times, 2 June 2006, <http://tinyurl.com/lf67t>): 'the symbolism of Dr Rice's gambit was more important than the substance. The State Department is now into the most critical phase yet of a delicate and high-risk game. It is a game that some in Washington feel is destined to fail; but, for the time being at least, the President has ruled that it is the game that the US will play. Few people in Washington believe Iran is going to abandon its attempts to join the nuclear club without serious international pressure or even the deeply unattractive military option. The only hope of avoiding the apocalyptic choice is a regime of eye-wateringly tight international economic and diplomatic pressure. But to achieve that, the US has to be seen to be working overtime on the diplomacy.'

Because of the Iraq war, the world is sceptical regarding US policy towards Iran. The opportunity is there for a propaganda victory, however, according to Baker: 

'With Iran, the US has to succeed where it largely failed in Iraq, in demonstrating to a sceptical world that the US really wants to give diplomacy a chance to work, and to ensure that if (and when) it fails, it will not be the US that will be responsible. The argument at the State Department is that, having thus demonstrated its bona fides the US will be able to persuade the rest of the world to get tough with the Iranians.'

The point is not to achieve a diplomatic solution, resolving the concerns around Iran's nuclear programme by negotiation. The point is to use diplomatic trickery to shift responsibility for the crisis away from the US and towards Iran. So far there have been considerable gains in this area, as many countries fall in line with the US demand. 

CHINA 
Not everyone is falling into line, however, including at least one permanent member of the Security Council. Wang Guangya, China's ambassador to the UN, said the United States should provide Iran with security assurances and drop its demand that Iran cease uranium enrichment before such talks could begin: 'I think it in a way proves that the U.S. is more serious about the negotiations than about other options, but I do hope that this offer could be less conditional,' he said.

Wang also stressed the need for the US to offer more "attractive carrots" to the Iranians, including crucial security assurances, and a pledge to allow Tehran to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program, including a small research-and-development project on uranium enrichment. (Washington Post, 1 June 2006; <http://tinyurl.com/mhdfb>) 

This seems an entirely sensible approach, but is being drowned out by US propaganda, amplified by the world's media.