[JNV] JNV Media Note: The Attorney General's Advice, Government Spin and The Weapons Inspectors

[Milan Rai]

Dear all

The publication of the Attorney General's legal advice gives the anti-war movement an opportunity to put the issue of Iraq firmly on the map. We do need, however, to be able to combat the spin that is coming thick and fast.

I hope the following notes are useful in responding to some of the government lies and media servility in the next couple of days. A longer discussion (and both the Attorney General's statements) is/are on our website <www.j-n-v.org>.

These notes have been written to help in lobbying journalists in broadcast and print media. I guess they can be used on candidates too!

Best wishes

Milan Rai
JNV

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JUSTICE NOT VENGEANCE
Media Note


The Attorney General's Legal Advice, Government Spin and the Weapons Inspectors

A JNV media note by Milan Rai, with assistance from Genny Bove, Ali Klevnas, Mike Lewis and Jonathan Stevenson


INTRODUCTION


As the Government attempts to defend the gap between the legal advice rendered by Lord Goldsmith on 7

March with the statement made in his name on 17 March, a crucial part of the spin operation involves distorting

the work of the UN weapons inspectors in this period.


Journalists should be made aware of the facts about this period. The Government is relying on the low profile of

the inspectors during this period to try to hoodwink media professionals.


Jack Straw and Tony Blair claimed today that the Attorney General's change of mind between 7 and 17 March

were brought about by 'changed circumstances'. They are re-writing the record.


Circumstances did indeed change: what changed between 7 and 17 March were weapons inspectors' statements

of *increasing* cooperation by Iraq; and *no* new evidence of lack of cooperation, or failure to disarm.


The Attorney General's position on 7 March was that war would only be legal if 'strong factual grounds' could

be provided by the UN weapons inspectors that 'Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity [to disarm]'.


If such grounds were not evident on 7 March, the UN inspectors gave the *opposite* evidence between 7 and

17 March. Lord Goldsmith's insistence, and that of Tony Blair and Jack Straw today, that changing circumstances

in that time provided convincing grounds for legality, is thus demonstrably untrue.


Instead, they have re-written the record of precisely the weapons inspectors' statements that we now know

were so central to the Attorney General's legal opinion.



SUMMARY



Jack Straw says that Iraqi cooperation with UN weapons inspectors was decreasing in the first half of March

2003, when it was actually increasing.


Jack Straw misrepresents the 173-page 'clusters document' drawn up by UN weapons inspectors into 'evidence'

of Iraqi noncompliance, when it actually identified areas where there was a 'lack of evidence' about Iraqi

compliance.


Jack Straw erases the inspectors' 'key remaining disarmament tasks' and their 'draft work programme' from

history, despite their central importance in the legality of war, according to the Attorney General.


Jack Straw skates over the fact that the inspection effort in Iraq was brought to a premature end by the United

States and Britain, just as it was about to enter a final, decisive phase.


These are desperate manoeuvres. Activists and journalists should try to stop the Government getting away with

this re-writing of history.



JACK STRAW'S INTERVENTION



On the Today programme this morning (28 April), Jack Straw said that 'the evidence of Iraq's continuing further

material breach, its failure to comply with its clear obligations mounted, not least in that 173-page document

which was [presented] by Dr Blix [the chief UN weapons inspector] to the Security Council in the very late

evening UK time of the 7th of March.'


The Foreign Secretary also rubbished the recent remarks by Hans Blix, saying, 'Dr Blix is now saying this, but the

whole burden of what Dr Blix was saying before the Security Council in January-February and March the 7th of

2003 was frankly different. He didn't have to put that 173-page document before the Security Council, which did

not say in 173 pages, <By the way, Saddam is in compliance.> What he did say is, <Here are 29 separate

chapters of unresolved disarmament questions dealing with the disarmament obligations in respect of the Iraqi

government.>.'


Here are the facts on these matters:



1) MOUNTING EVIDENCE

'the evidence of Iraq's continuing further material breach, its failure to comply with its clear obligations mounted'



See the 7 March statement by Dr Blix to the Security Council, which can be obtained from 'Selected Security

Council Briefings' at <www.unmovic.org>. (Dr Blix did not make another statement to the Security Council until

19 March, hours before the bombing began.)


In his 7 March statement, referring to the voluntary destruction by Baghdad of al Samoud missiles, Dr Blix

famously said: 'The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first

since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being

destroyed.'


Referring to other forms of Iraqi cooperation, Dr Blix said, 'What are we to make of these activities? One can

hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an

acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.'


Dr Blix continued: 'It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with

a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as <active>, or even <proactive>,

these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute <immediate> cooperation. Nor

do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to

them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.'


In other words, far from 'evidence of Iraq's continuing further material breach, its failure to comply with its clear

obligations' 'mounting', as Jack Straw claims, the reverse was the case.


Iraq's compliance with its obligations was increasing, not decreasing.


Iraq's cooperation was increasing not decreasing.



2) THE CLUSTERS DOCUMENT

'that 173-page document which was [presented] by Dr Blix [the chief UN weapons inspector] to the Security

Council'



The 173-page 'cluster document' can be obtained from the weapons inspectors' site <http://www.unmovic.org/>.



It is an exhaustive study of the available documents and past investigations into Iraq's suspected weapons. For

various categories of weapons and weapons systems, 'identifies the questions that are deemed outstanding and

unresolved'.


The cluster document said that a question could be unresolved 'because of the lack of convincing evidence [that

a weapon or component had been destroyed] or, in a few cases, because of evidence that conflicts with Iraq’s

account.'


On 27 January 2003, Dr Blix had explained the issues clearly, saying of the documents used to compile the

173-page study: 'These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do

they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks,

which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.'

<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm>


Far from the 7 March cluster document being new and 'mounting evidence' of Iraq's failure to comply with its

clear obligations, it was a historical survey of areas where there was a 'lack of evidence' about Iraq's compliance

with its disarmament obligations, which had to be cleared up.



3) KEY REMAINING DISARMAMENT TASKS

  'that 173-page document before the Security Council, which did not say in 173 pages, <By the way, Saddam is in

compliance>.'



True, the 173-page cluster document did not say 'Saddam is in compliance'. Nor did it say 'Saddam is not in

compliance.'


The cluster document identified issues which had to be investigated. It was the basis for the drawing up of

priorities for inspection: 'key remaining disarmament tasks' to be completed by Iraq.


The drawing up of 'key remaining disarmament tasks' was required of the inspectors by UN Security Council

Resolution 1284  <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Keyresolutions/sres99-1284.htm> or

<http://tinyurl.com/8og2u>.


This was a British Resolution.


The 173-page cluster document invoked by Mr Straw, and the key remaining disarmament tasks were actually

critical stages in the drawing up of a programme of work for the Iraqi authorities (and for the inspectors) which

could clarify for once and for all


(a) whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and/or

(b) whether Iraq was prepared to fully cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors.


The inspectors' draft work programme, containing the 'key remaining disarmament tasks', was submitted in

writing to the Security Council on 17 March 2003.


Dr Blix's oral presentation of the draft work programme to the Security Council on 19 March can be found at

<http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/pages/security_council_briefings.asp> (or <http://tinyurl.com/ajj3t>


and comments by Security Council members can be found at

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7696.doc.htm> (or <http://tinyurl.com/b8f95>)



4)Torpedoing the inspectors



Jack Straw and the Government have consistently obscured or denigrated the significance of the inspectors, and

their 'key disarmament tasks' and 'work programme', presented to the Securing Council on 17 March.


Jack Straw and the Government have never acknowledged the fact that the inspections were about to enter a

final and decisive phase on 17 March, a final and decisive phase that would last only months, according to Hans

Blix himself.


Blix said on 7 March: 'How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While

cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant.

Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to

verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take

years, nor weeks, but months.' <http://tinyurl.com/e455k>


Jack Straw and the Government have never acknowledged the fact that the inspectors were ordered out of Iraq

by George W. Bush.


In his address to the nation on 17 March, President Bush said, 'Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq

within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For

their own safety, all foreign nationals -- including journalists *and inspectors* -- should leave Iraq immediately.'

See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/7ob3>.



5)The significance of the inspectors for the Attorney General's legal advice



In his 7 March advice, the Attorney General pointed out that:


'the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will *only

be sustainable* if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final

opportunity.' (emphasis added)


In the Guardian (28 April) Anthony Lester QC described the phrase 'only be sustainable' as 'very strong words'

for a lawyer.


The Attorney General went on to say that it was necessary 'to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of [Iraqi]

non-compliance and non-cooperation'.


This could only have been demonstrated through the implementation of the UNMOVIC/IAEA work programme,

and the performance (or non-performance) of the 'key remaining disarmament tasks'.


The Attorney General then warned that 'Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of

UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect.'


UNMOVIC and the IAEA were clear that they could not come to a final view on Iraq's weapons programmes, or

of Iraq's cooperation with them, until they had completed the 'key remaining disarmament tasks' in the draft

work programme.


Therefore, 'hard evidence' backed up by the inspectors would probably be obtainable only at the completion of

this programme.


In other words, the British Government's senior legal adviser, the Attorney General, put forward a formal legal

opinion to Tony Blair before the war which identified a central role for UN weapons inspectors and, by

extension, the 'key remaining disarmament tasks' programme of work, in determining the legality of military

action against Iraq.


A longer version of this discussion is available on <www.j-n-v.org>


-- 
Milan Rai
Justice Not Vengeance
landline 0845 458 9571 (UK) +44 1424 428 792 (int)
mobile phone (0)7980 748 555
www.j-n-v.org